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Anderson, K., Nelgen, S., 2011. Global Wine Markets, 1961 to 2009: A Statistical Compendium. University of Adelaide Press, Adelaide
publication of an index of revealed comparative advantage suggests that the Australian wine industry had come under increased competition from
other “New World” producers in the ﬁrst decade of this century. We examine this inﬂuence by comparing the transformation of winegrapes into
wine volume and value in the 11 largest wine-exporting countries during the years, 2000–2009. Our focus is on the challenge issued by other
New World producers from the Southern Hemisphere to Australian producers, and the continuing challenge to Old World global supremacy by
New World producers and its response. Four performance measures are used this study. Two key trends are evident. First, all countries migrated
to higher price points, albeit with differing degrees of success: slightly declining productivity in transforming winegrapes into wine output was
overwhelmed by price/quality effects, leading to substantial gains in transforming winegrapes into wine value. Second, New World producers
plus Portugal and Spain were much more successful in achieving gains in their export value proposition than they were in extracting value in their
domestic markets. Results show that Australian wine producers had lost some of their competitive advantage during the 2000s as their pre-
existing strategy dominated by the export of high-volume wines by large companies at low to medium price points, and their reliance on a
reputation for reliable good quality for the price point was beginning to fail in the face of competition from both New World and Old World
producers. Acknowledgement of this outcome has led to a good deal of introspection, and recognition of the need to promote the wine regions of
Australia, based on higher-quality wines, and to select and promote quality indicators.
& 2015 UniCeSV, University of Florence. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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During the ﬁnal two decades of the 20th century, the
internationalisation of wine production and consumption
continued apace. Robinson (2006) observed that the broad
delineation between the Old World producers of France,
Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain and the Southern Hemi-
sphere New World (SHNW) wine-producing countries –
particularly Australia, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand and10.1016/j.wep.2014.12.002
15 UniCeSV, University of Florence. Production and hosting by E
g author. Tel.: þ61 267732775; fax: þ61 267733596.
ss: eﬂeming@une.edu.au (E. Fleming).
nder responsibility of Wine Economics and Policy.South Africa – as discrete markets continued to be eroded.
New markets developed, traditional markets diversiﬁed and the
mapping of the international wine trade became increasingly
routinised (see, for example, Anderson and Nelgen (2011)).
During these two decades, the Australian wine industry
exempliﬁed this internationalisation, in particular the challenge
that the SHNW represented to the Old World producers.
Silverman et al. (2001) described Australia's achievement
during this time as “pioneering wine as a universal ﬁrst choice
lifestyle beverage”. However, by the turn of the century, the
export strategy ﬁrst adopted by the Australian wine industry
had been followed by other SHNW wine-producing countries,
notably Argentina, Chile, New Zealand and South Africa,lsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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the new. In their recent study comparing the relative perfor-
mance of the major wine-producing countries for the year
2000, Grant et al. (2015, p. 1) observed the pegging back of
Australian primus inter pares status amongst New World
producers. They concluded that “the hunter became the
hunted” in the competition for proﬁtable wine exports.
Was this indeed the case? The changes in export volume and
export value for Australia and other SHNW wine-producing
countries for the decade 2000–2009 are presented in Table 1.
The export value growth rates of New Zealand and Argentina
are particularly conspicuous. New Zealand's share of the total
export value of the ﬁve SHNW countries listed in Table 1
increased from 5 per cent in 2000 to 12 per cent in 2009. Over
the same period Argentina's export value share increased from
8 per cent to 12 per cent. These increases came largely at
Australia's (and to a lesser extent Chile's) expense. While
Australia's share of total export volume of the ﬁve SHNW
countries listed fell only slightly (around 3 per cent) its export
value contribution fell by 11 per cent (from 46 per cent in 2000
to 35 per cent in 2009), suggesting that Australia conceded
signiﬁcant ground to some of its SHNW competitors.
In this study we explore these changes in detail. Following
from Grant et al. (2015) and utilising the same performance
measures of the transformation of the core input – winegrapes
– into wine output volume and value, we compare the
performance of the ﬁve Old World wine producers (France,
Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and their ﬁve New World
counterparts for the decade 2000–2009 inclusive.
The paper is divided into ﬁve parts. In the following section,
we set out the rationale for the study. Section 3 provides an
account of the adaptation of the method and data following
from Grant et al. (2015), distinguishing in particular between
efﬁciency measurement in standard productivity analysis and
the performance indices developed by Grant et al. (2015). In
Section 4 we examine the relative performance of the wine-
exporting countries for the decade 2000–2009, focusing on the
salient features of each measure across the cohort of wine-
exporting countries. The paper concludes in Section 5 by
reﬂecting on the implications of the ﬁndings for the Australian
wine industry and reiterating some qualiﬁcations of the data
utilised.Table 1
Changes in export volume and value: SHNW producers, 2000–2009.
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2011, pp. 72, 95).
Country Volume
(million
litres) 2000
Volume
(million
litres) 2009
%
Increase
Value
(US$m)
2000
Value
(US$m)
2009
%
Increase
Australia 311 772 248 897 1802 201
New
Zealand
20 129 645 90 637 708
Argentina 73 291 399 150 636 424
Chile 297 692 233 577 1374 238
South
Africa
155 429 277 243 711 2932. Rationale for the study
The aims of the study are fourfold. First, to highlight the
trend in competitive advantage in international wine trade
towards quality away from low cost. Second, to provide a
more ﬁnely nuanced empirical account of the competitive
relationships between the 10 major wine-exporting economies
than is revealed by international trade data (see, for example,
Anderson and Nelgen (2011)). Third, to offer an explanation
for the relative positions of these wine-producing economies in
terms of both the performance of their wine production and
their relative success in international markets. Fourth, to
canvass the implications for the Australian industry noting
the limitations of public policy in this regard.
Deﬁning national wine industry performance is central to
achieving these aims. Performance by these industries can be
judged in different ways according to the policy milieu. The
simplest measure is export penetration: the extent to which
winegrapes can be transformed into wine that can ﬁnd a buyer
in export markets. Increasingly, being able to compete proﬁt-
ably in export markets depends also on the price points at
which the wines can be exported: the higher the price points,
the more valuable the exported wine to the industry. The
second measure we use, export value proposition, takes this
value creation into account and is deﬁned in this context as an
afﬁrmation why a foreign wine buyer should purchase a
particular wine based on the rationale that this wine will add
more value to the buyer's transaction in the export market for
which it is destined than would any other wine.
Being competitive in export markets is, however, only a
partial measure of an industry's overall performance; it also
depends on its ability to defend its domestic market share. Our
third measure, productivity, is integral to an industry's ability
simultaneously to succeed in both its export markets and
domestic market. The fourth and broadest measure of industry
performance that we use is its total value proposition, deﬁned
as an afﬁrmation why a wine buyer – whether domestic or
foreign – should purchase a particular wine based on the
rationale that this wine will add more value to the buyer's
transaction in the market for which it is destined than would
any other wine.
3. Method and data
As indicated above, we compare the relative performance of
the major wine-producing countries using the same four
performance measures of the transformation of winegrapes
into wine output volume and value used by Grant et al. (2015).
They are (1) an export market penetration index, deﬁned by the
transformation of winegrapes into wine export volume; (2) an
export value proposition index, deﬁned as the ability of
exporters to capture value from the perceived quality of wine
exports; (3) a productivity index, deﬁned as the transformation
of winegrapes into total wine output, taking into account the
industry servicing both its domestic and export markets; and
(4) a global value proposition index, deﬁned as the ability of
wine producers to capture value from the perceived quality of
2TFPE differs from TFP in that the latter measure for the most productive
industry is normalised at unity, and the TFPE values of less productive
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analysis to the “pivotal” year of 2000 when Australia had
reached the peak of its dominance among New World
producers, our analysis compares subsequent performance
covering the years 2000–2009.
For all four performance measures used in this study we
employ the same assumptions and the same method of
calculation used by Grant et al. (2015). A key assumption
relates to the absence of national winery input data that forces
us to assume that data on capital, labour, materials and services
used in wine production and marketing are constant across
national industries and, for the current study, also over the
study period. This assumption means that we are unable to
compare national wine industries on the preferred basis of their
proﬁtability. By assessing national industries as a whole we are
assuming that all sections of each industry experienced the
same changes in their competitive position. This assumption is
more important than in the study by Grant et al. (2015)
because we analyse performance changes over time. Also, we
focus on wine-making, ignoring events in viticulture except for
how they affect wine production. Another important assump-
tion is that the quality of wine, as perceived by buyers, is
determined independently of the level of inputs used in its
production and marketing. The need to remedy these data
deﬁciencies is discussed in the ﬁnal section.
We adopt an output orientation to the analysis of wine
industry performance, which implies that the wine industries
attempt to maximise their output of wine at the highest
possible prices employing a ﬁxed set of inputs (including
winegrape output). The econometric software, DPIN3.0 Pro-
fessional, was used to calculate the four performance measures
and decompose them into aggregate wine performance frontier
shifts and technical, scale and mix efﬁciency effects
(O’Donnell, 2011) at the industry level.
O’Donnell (2011) measured annual productivity change as
the change in total factor productivity (TFP), which is the
product of the changes in the three efﬁciency components
(technical, scale and mix) and technical change. He deﬁned
technical change by a shift of the production frontier, whereas
we deﬁne changes in each of the performance measures as a
shift of the frontier of the sampled countries.1
Whereas efﬁciency measures in standard productivity ana-
lysis refer to distance from a production frontier, we use
efﬁciency measures to reﬂect distance from each speciﬁed
performance frontier. Technical efﬁciency occurs when an
industry produces the maximum feasible level of a perfor-
mance measure for a given amount of inputs of winegrapes.
Scale efﬁciency occurs when an industry operates at its
optimal scale. An industry achieves mix efﬁciency when it
produces an optimal mix of outputs of bottled still wine, bulk
still wine and bottled sparkling wine. The product of these1The third of our measures is indeed productivity, which follows exactly
O’Donnell’s deﬁnition. We have avoided using the term “productivity” for the
ﬁrst two and last performance measures because they are strongly inﬂuenced
by factors (such as exchange rate and wine demand) that lie outside the
inﬂuence of the wine industries in sampled countries.three efﬁciency components is denoted total efﬁciency, a
parallel term to TFP efﬁciency as speciﬁed by O’Donnell
(2011).2 A fully efﬁcient wine industry would be operating on
all performance frontiers given the technologies used to
transform winegrapes into wine. Four outputs were included
in the model: three variables of wine export volumes and
prices, decomposed into bottled still, bulk and bottled spark-
ling wines, and one domestic supply variable measured as
revenue. Input data comprise solely winegrapes in the absence
of data on other inputs. The US GDP deﬂator was applied to
deﬂate prices in US dollars in year 2000 values. We used
Anderson and Nelgen (2011) as the data source for the output
and input variables.
For brevity, discussion of cross-country variations and
trends in efﬁciency components are conﬁned to changes in
the two performance measures involving value propositions
(performance measures 2 and 4). The cross-country compar-
isons presented throughout the paper are reported as indexes
with the Australian wine industry set at a value of unity in the
year 2000.3
4. Results and discussion of performance change, 2000–
2009
4.1. Export market penetration
Table 2 shows the export market penetration estimates for
the 11 countries in the year 2000. Annual rates of change in
export market penetration (transformation of winegrapes into
export volumes) during the 2000s are presented in the second
column of Table 3.
The aggregate export volume frontier expanded by 4.5 per
cent per year over the decade (Table 3) to satisfy an expanding
demand for wine worldwide (4.2 per cent) (Anderson and
Nelgen, 2011, p. 77). However, not all countries shared
equally in the expansion. In offering explanations for this
divergence in trends, we now examine the particular char-
acteristics of national wine industries and offer some compara-
tive observations, focusing mainly on Australia and three of its
major competitors, Argentina, Chile and New Zealand.
4.1.1. Australia
Australia continued to improve its export market penetration
moderately during the 2000s, achieving a growth rate for
export market penetration of 7.4 per cent. It ﬁnished the decade
with an index slightly higher than both New Zealand and
Chile. The momentum of Australia's export success in the
1990s saw total grapevine area harvested increase by nearly 4industries are set as the ratio of their TFP to the TFP of the most productive
industry. In other words, the overall performance of each country's wine
industry is relative to that of the best-performing country.
3The transitive and multiplicatively complete Färe–Primont index was
employed to enable a multilateral comparison of levels and trends in
performance indicators and their components over the period of study from
2000 to 2009.
Table 2
Performance indices in the year 2000.
Source: Grant et al. (2015).
Country Export market
penetration
index
Export value
proposition
index
Productivity
index
Global value
proposition
index
New World
Argentina 0.192 0.243 1.148 0.328
Chile 1.078 2.179 0.896 0.990
New
Zealand
1.243 0.830 1.018 0.871
South
Africa
0.577 0.805 1.148 0.738
USA 0.429 0.364 1.117 0.750
Old World
France 1.045 1.115 1.029 0.912
Germany 0.882 0.552 1.051 0.374
Italy 0.970 1.134 0.953 0.605
Portugal 0.580 0.679 1.034 0.537
Spain 1.139 0.907 1.047 0.646
Note: Australia¼1.0 for all indices.
Table 3
Annual rates of change in performance indices, 2000–2009.
Country Export market
penetration
index (per cent)
Export value
proposition
index (per
cent)
Productivity
index (per
cent)
Global value
proposition
index (per
cent)
New World
Argentina 18.4 18.9 1.9 5.4
Australia 7.4 13.3 3.5 4.4
Chile 3.8 4.4 2.6 2.9
New
Zealand
n.s. 17.7 n.s. 14.0
South
Africa
6.6 14.8 2.3 7.6
USA n.s. 14.8 0.5 6.6
Old World
France 2.9 3.7 n.s. 4.3
Germany 5.9 14.0 0.8 10.4
Italy 5.2 5.8 n.s. 4.4
Portugal 7.7 12.7 2.0 6.3
Spain 2.7 7.2 1.5 4.3
Frontier
shift
4.5 6.1 1.0 5.6
Note: n.s. not signiﬁcant at 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.
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2009. Australia's share of world wine production volume in
2009 was 4.4 per cent, up from 3.5 per cent in 2000, but down
on its 5.2 per cent peak in 2005 (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011,
p. 47). Over the same period, Australia's share of world wine
export volume grew from 4.9 per cent to 8.9 per cent with
exports as a percentage of domestic wine production increasing
twofold (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, pp. 83, 87).
While Australia's total export volume more than doubled
over the decade (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 72), the
percentage of bulk wines in its still wine exports rose
markedly. In 2000, this ﬁgure was 12 per cent; by 2009, itwas touching 40 per cent. Anderson (2010) explained that
although some of that recent growth can be attributed to
consumer concerns about the carbon footprint associated with
shipping bottled wine and to supermarkets developing their
own labels, much of the increase was a consequence of over-
supply.
4.1.2. Chile
Chile's relatively low growth rate of 3.8 per cent can be
largely attributed to its already high index at the beginning of
the period. Its continued expansion during the 2000s was
driven by an increase in wine production of 5.34 per cent per
year (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 45). Given stagnant
consumption in the domestic market, exports as a percentage
of total wine production volume increased from 45 per cent in
2000 to 70 per cent in 2009, a mean annual increase of 9.6 per
cent (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 83). This was consider-
ably higher than the proportions of other major wine-exporting
countries except Australia (66 per cent) and New Zealand (63
per cent). The industry associations, Viñas de Chile and
ChiledVid, pressed for a greater presence in export markets
during the 2000s. They were “created or renewed” in the latter
part of the 1990s in response to the growth taking place in the
industry (Kunc and Bas, 2009, p. 11) and a need to achieve
greater penetration in export markets. Their impact was
reinforced later in the decade by the initiation of Wines of
Chile as the international promotional arm of Vinos de Chile,
which in turn was an amalgamation in 2007 of Viñas de Chile
and ChiledVid. The initiation and development of Wines of
Chile were a major step forward in strengthening the export
orientation of the wine industry. Its membership of 93 wineries
represents 90 per cent of Chile's bottled wine exports. Concha
y Toro extended its domination of Chilean wine exports and by
the end of the decade its export share was greater than 60 per
cent with wines being sold at numerous price points (Morss,
2010). It was rated the second most powerful wine brand in the
world in 2009 by Intangible Business (2010), cited by
Anderson and Nelgen (2011, p. 68).
4.1.3. Argentina
A very high growth rate in export market penetration
achieved by Argentina during the decade – much higher than
in any other country – begs explanation. Stein (2008, p. 18)
and Morrison and Rabellotti (2014, p. 20) have suggested that
it was mainly a “catching-up” process. Argentina's long
tradition of wine production and consumption was based on
a large domestic market, which provided the springboard to
export development, permitting “producers to take relatively
large risks in the export area because they have strong backup
within their own country”. Stein (2008, p. 19) also observed
the positive effect of a change in local drinking habits towards
a more discerning choice of premium wines, which strength-
ened the complementarity between the domestic and export
markets.
This large domestic base for the industry began to diminish
in the 1980s although it remained important, accounting for 76
per cent of the total production volume in 2009 (Anderson and
E. Fleming et al. / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 115–126 119Nelgen, 2011, p. 83). Anderson and Nelgen (2011, p. 151)
reported that the mean domestic consumption of beverage
wine per person more than halved from 82 litres in the period
1975–79 to 36.4 litres by 1995–99, and total beverage wine
consumption continued to decline throughout the 2000s by
2.07 per cent per year (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 48).
This decline, described by Stein (2008, pp. 17–18) as “a
driving force behind the resolve to export”, contributed to a
change by the wine industry from a strategy focused on the
domestic market to a vent-for-surplus strategy. This process of
reconversión was achieved not only through the implementa-
tion of an industry strategy; it also entailed the formation of
strategic partnerships and relationship management (Thach
and Cuellar, 2010). Leading wineries in the industry began
to seek new export markets from the late 1980s during the
reconversión.
Measures were put in place by the industry to shift the
export demand function for Argentine wines (Wines of
Argentina, 2011). Wines of Argentina embarked on an
ambitious export development plan in 2000 following the
creation of a special fund to promote wine exports to UK and
USA in 1999. The aim was to achieve a 10 per cent share of
the global wine market by 2020. It conducted fairs, tours and
other activities abroad, organised wine tastings and invited
inﬂuential people in the global wine industry to visit wine
regions and wineries in Argentina. Some major wineries
initiated strategic partnerships to source funds and improve
distribution channels abroad (Thach and Cuellar, 2010). Stein
(2008, pp.7–8) described the efforts to develop the export
market by some of the major pioneers of the industry inclusive
of “The pursuit of international consumers … Concentration
on the production of wines that could attain sufﬁcient quality
to compete internationally … sweeping upgrades in technol-
ogy both in the winery and in the vineyard focused on quality
improvement [and] a fundamental change from a producer-
centred to a consumer-centred industry model”. The Plan
Estratégico Vitivinicola 2020 (Wine Strategic Plan 2020) was
developed in 2004 with the primary aim of increasing wine
export values (San Martín et al., 2008, p. 2). Not all of these
efforts have been an unequivocal success (Stein, 2008, pp. 26–
28). Nevertheless, they paid dividends given the dramatic
increase in exports that was achieved. By 2009, the four largest
wine ﬁrms in Argentina (Peñaﬂor (1.1 per cent of world wine
sales volume), FeCoVitA Coop, RPB and Bodegas y Viñedos
Garbin) accounted for 60.5 per cent of wine sales volume
(Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 66).
4.1.4. New Zealand
The New Zealand industry experienced highly erratic move-
ments over the ﬁrst lustrum: its exports as a percentage of wine
volume produced increased from 34 per cent in 2000 to 93 per
cent in 2003, and then back to 49 per cent by 2006 (Anderson
and Nelgen, 2011, p. 83). This high variability in wine exports
as a percentage of wine volume produced stabilised in the
second lustrum to range between 57 per cent and 63 per cent in
the years 2007–2009 such that the annual average growth rate
for the decade computed to a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.49 percent (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 83). Yet, this benign
statistical relationship between wine exports on one hand and
total wine production on the other hand belies the dramatic
increase in overall wine export volume for the decade: In 2000,
New Zealand exported 19.2 million litres of wine; by 2009 this
had increased to 112.6 million litres (or by a factor of 6 in 10
years). Further, this ﬁgure accelerated in the second lustrum,
from 51.4 to 112.6 million litres in 2005–2009 compared with
moving from 19.2 million litres to 31.1 million litres in 2000–
2004 (NZW, 2009, p. 2). It also reveals that domestic wine
consumption increased – from 16.68 litres per capita in 2000 to
20.16 litres per capita in 2009 – to maintain its position relative
to the increase in export volume (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011,
p. 83).
4.1.5. Other countries
South Africa had started the decade with a penetration index
well below those in fellow SHNW countries – New Zealand,
Chile and Australia (see Table 2) – and made little progress in
closing the gap over the decade despite moderate growth in
export market penetration of 6.6 per cent (Table 3). Davidson
et al. (2009) reasoned that the progress that was made owed a
good deal to the efforts of the wine industry to transform itself
and become more competitive in the global market. While UK
was the major market destination for export penetration, wine
exporters achieved some success in diversifying their exports
to other market destinations.
The US index of wine export market penetration did not
change signiﬁcantly throughout the decade. Among Old World
producers, the export market penetration indices for Portugal,
Germany and Italy improved moderately during the decade
(Table 3). The growth rate in Portugal was from a much lower
base than other Old World producers. Modest growth rates
were recorded in France and Spain.
4.2. Export value proposition
Examining column 3 of Table 3, estimates of the export
value proposition index for transforming winegrapes into
export value provide a different picture for some countries
from that reported above for export market penetration. The
index growth rate for New World producers was substantially
higher in all countries except Chile where it was only slightly
higher (4.4 per cent against a mean of 15.9 per cent for the
other New World exporters). Again, we offer some observa-
tions by way of explanation.
4.2.1. Sources of change in the export value proposition index
The export wine value frontier shifted outwards strongly (by
6.1 per cent annually) during the study period. This was
considerably higher than the rate of outward shift of the export
wine volume frontier discussed above.
There were also major changes in technical efﬁciency.
Countries with low commencing technical efﬁciency indices
substantially improved their conversion of winegrapes into
wine export value. Argentina, South Africa, USA and Ger-
many increased their technical efﬁciency indices by more than
Table 4
Mean efﬁciency indices in the export and total value models, 2000–2009.
Country Technical
efﬁciency
Scale
efﬁciency
Mix
efﬁciency
Total
efﬁciency
Export Total Export Total Export Total Export Total
New World
Argentina 0.256 0.432 0.810 0.969 0.780 0.719 0.163 0.301
Australia 1.000 1.000 0.924 1.000 0.753 0.934 0.705 0.934
Chile 1.000 1.000 0.983 0.983 0.987 0.905 0.972 0.889
New Zealand 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.588 0.711 0.588 0.711
South Africa 0.737 0.970 0.937 0.968 0.818 0.799 0.572 0.750
USA 0.494 0.978 0.665 0.994 0.799 0.721 0.251 0.702
Old World
France 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.492 0.839 0.492 0.839
Germany 0.612 0.652 0.933 0.964 0.717 0.797 0.420 0.501
Italy 0.933 0.933 0.577 0.648 0.808 0.880 0.437 0.532
Portugal 0.720 0.740 0.831 0.912 0.715 0.806 0.430 0.544
Spain 0.997 0.652 0.730 0.964 0.580 0.797 0.422 0.501
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7.0 per cent and 10.1 per cent per year, respectively). These
increases were from relatively low bases and mean technical
efﬁciency for Argentina, South Africa, USA and Germany
over the study period was still below their fellow New World
and Old World producers at 0.26, 0.74, 0.49 and 0.61,
respectively. Mean technical efﬁciency for the study period
across the 11 countries increased by 2 per cent per year from
0.74 to 0.85, and ﬁnished not far below the level of technical
efﬁciency achieved in the Australian and a number of other
industries (1.0) and near to the frontier. The implication of this
trend is that differences in the technical efﬁciency in which the
sampled countries transformed winegrapes into value obtained
from wine exports narrowed markedly.
Mean scale efﬁciency was high at 0.85 (Table 4), varying
little over the study period. With the exceptions of Italy and
Spain, which had lower scores, it suggests that the scale of the
wine industry was not an important factor inﬂuencing the
efﬁciency with which winegrapes were transformed into export
wine value.
Mean mix efﬁciency increased annually by 2.4 per cent over
the decade across all producers, due mainly to increases in the
scores for Portugal (8.9 per cent per year), Argentina (5.4 per
cent per year), Australia (3.8 per cent per year) and South
Africa (2.3 per cent per year). The mix of wines exported by
the industries in these countries met with greater willingness to
pay by international buyers over the decade. Portuguese
exports of vinho verde wines and Argentine exports of Malbec
wines particularly found favour with global consumers during
the study period (Cortez et al., 2009; Pesme and Ruseler,
2011). Mean mix efﬁciency scores varied across countries for
the study period, from 0.99 for Chile to 0.49 for France
(Table 4). The relatively low score for France deserves
comment. In contrast to its high technical efﬁciency score,
its low mix efﬁciency score reﬂects the very high prices
received in export markets for sparkling wines relative to the
prices of France's more numerous still wine exports (about four
times as high) and the sparkling wine prices of other countries
(at least twice as high) according to Anderson and Nelgen
(2011, p. 110). The message from the low score is that the
industry in France should increase its sparkling wine exports at
the expense of bottled and bulk still wines. We return to this
French example below.
4.2.2. Australia
The rate of growth in the export value proposition for
Australian wine, while high at 13.3 per cent per year, lagged
behind all other New World producers except Chile (Table 3),
with the mean for the remaining New World producers
computing to 16.55 per cent. Ostensibly, Australia's initial
export accomplishments were underpinned by its market
penetration strategies in the UK and US supermarket sectors
and its wine export volumes more than doubled from 2000 to
2009. But over the same period, the unit value of wine exports
fell on average by 0.25 per cent per annum (Anderson and
Nelgen, 2011, p. 425). Anderson and Nelgen (2011, p. 375)
reported that the export value share of super-premium gradeAustralian still wine by the end of the study period (2009) was
only 8 per cent. This share compares with a global ﬁgure of 17
per cent, 21 per cent for the major European exporting
countries and 60 per cent for one of Australia's major New
World competitors, New Zealand, in the same year.
As a result, Australia's TFPE score over the study period
was depressed by a relatively low mix efﬁciency score of 0.75.
This score can be explained by the fact that the price data
reported by Anderson and Nelgen (2011, p. 110) show a
substantially lower and declining export price of Australian
bulk wines relative to the export prices of bottled still and
sparkling wines in a period when the proportion of bulk wine
exports trebled (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 73).
Morrison and Rabellotti (2014, p. 20) cited Aylward (2006,
2008) asserting that the Australian wine industry suffered
“structural weaknesses of the domestic model of wine produc-
tion, based on R&D, centralisation, on rather standardised and
homogeneous products and on the dominance of large ﬁrms”,
with the outcome that demand changes in the 2000s requiring
greater differentiation and sophistication to capture unit price
increases caught it unprepared as it had “got stuck into once
successful routines and practices”.
Consequently, Australian wines encountered strong compe-
tition from other SHNW wines in key export markets from
2000 onwards. This competition was particularly noticeable in
the second lustrum from New Zealand Sauvignon Blanc and
Argentine Malbec. There were ancillary adverse effects on the
demand for Australian wines from stagnant per capita con-
sumption in the UK and declining per capita consumption in
USA (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 51), and the strength of
the Australian dollar was inﬂuential in the decline in Aus-
tralia's international competiveness from 2007 (Anderson and
Wittwer, 2013a, b).4.2.3. Chile
The Chilean wine industry began the decade from a high
point, with the highest TFPE that was maintained until 2006.
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of its wines being “good value for money”, which was
successful for most of the past three decades (copying the
earlier Australian strategy). However, arguably the industry
failed to shake off the tag of being good value but cheap
(Universia Knowledge@Wharton, 2003; Veseth, 2011).
Further, buyer perceptions of cheapness have made it difﬁcult
for the industry to consolidate a niche among the premium
market segments. This perception of Chilean wines was
disputed by Chadwick (2003), who contended that quality
has improved in the classic varieties of Cabernet, Merlot,
Sauvignon and Chardonnay to which have been added exciting
new varieties of Carménère and Syrah. Chadwick (2003)
pointed to “a new generation of talented young viticulturists
and winemakers” leading the way with improved production
techniques. Nevertheless, the persistence of pricing as the main
strategic weapon by many wine companies has continued to
threaten Chile's image as a quality wine producer. An
increased proportion of bulk wine sales during the 2000s
strengthened the perception of cheapness, with the mean price
of bulk wine declining in real terms from USD0.86 per litre in
2000 to USD0.60 per litre in 2010 (Anderson and Nelgen,
2011). According to Chadwick (2003), Chile still lacks a clear
national image as a wine producer. Unlike the Argentine wine
industry, the wine industry in Chile has not developed its so-
called signature varietal wine despite efforts to brand Carmé-
nère as such a wine. Veseth (2011) concluded that it is “still
unclear how many of Chile's Merlot vines are really Carme-
nere”. Stein (2008, pp. 5–6) observed that this wine had not yet
achieved the central role in export growth that the Argentine
industry had achieved with Malbec. Efforts to encourage
Chile's wine identity have been intensiﬁed in recent years by
Wines of Chile (Chadwick, 2003), whose Strategic Plan 2020
is based on four pillars: diversity and quality; sustainability;
country image; and innovation (Wines of Chile, 2011). All
pillars are directed towards emphasising Chile's unique pro-
position in the global market.
4.2.4. Argentina
The wine industry in Argentina began the decade with an
extremely low TFPE of 0.12. Its export value proposition
growth rate (18.9 per cent per year) was impressive even if it
was only similar to the rate of growth in the penetration index.
The growing need to dispose of wine in export markets
resulting from reduced domestic consumption was partly
responsible for a precipitous decline in export unit values in
the ﬁrst half of the 2000s (along with the effects of devaluation
of the peso, described above). The mean unit value of total
wine exports fell from USD2.05 per litre in 2000 to USD1.29
per litre by 2006, but recovered to USD2.18 per litre by 2009
(Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 111) as quality improvements
began to take effect in response to institutional innovations
(Silverman et al., 2001).
This recovery in the unit value of wine exports reﬂects the
success achieved in gaining international acceptability among
buyers for its wine exports, particularly Malbec wines.
Measures had been put in place in the 1990s to overcome aproblem of low-quality wines with the realisation that an
ambitious strategy of export penetration (particularly away
from the traditional Latin American market towards the
markets of high-income countries such as USA) would be
successful only if it was accompanied by a considerable
improvement in wine quality. Despite chaos in the general
economy in the ﬁrst lustrum of the decade, the process started
to yield dividends by the second lustrum. The top wineries that
led the move into export markets, such as Peñaﬂor and
Bodegas Esmeralda (the ﬁne wine division of Catena Wines),
were also to the fore in improving the quality of wine exports
(Stein, 2008, pp. 8–12). Pricing was a key feature of their
strategy, exploiting consumers' perceptions that high-quality
wines should have a high price (Stein, 2008, pp. 28–31).
Creating an image of quality wines in the premium market
would have trickle-down effects for wine exports in the lower-
priced market segments. Major wineries have in recent years
initiated numerous price points “from entry level to icon”
(Stein, 2008, p. 39).
4.2.5. New Zealand
The mean TFPE of 0.71 for the New Zealand wine industry
during the study period (Table 4) hides a major change in its
export fortunes. The industry had begun the period in sixth
place with a relatively low score of 0.40 but attained the
highest score among the 11 countries by the end of the period.
It switched strategies from volume expansion in the ﬁrst
lustrum to increasing the export unit value by moving to
higher price points, especially for Sauvignon Blanc wines, in
the second lustrum. This enabled it to achieve a rate of growth
in its export value proposition only slightly below that
achieved by the Argentine industry (17.7 per cent for the
former; 18.9 per cent for the latter) despite no upward trend in
export market penetration throughout the decade. The extent to
which New Zealand's increase in its export value proposition
for the decade was dependent on one variety – Sauvignon
Blanc – is difﬁcult to overstate. Of the ﬁve main grape
varieties harvested in the years 2000–2009, the quantity of
Cabernet Sauvignon decreased (from 3792 tonnes in 2000 to
2304 tonnes in 2009) while both Riesling and Chardonnay and
Sauvignon Blanc enjoyed nominal growth (from 4070 tonnes
to 6216 tonnes and from 23,593 tonnes to 34,393 tonnes
respectively). Pinot Noir production increased by a factor of 4
– from 6319 tonnes to 27,5487 tonnes; and Sauvignon Blanc
increased from 15,472 tonnes to 177,647 tonnes (NZW, 2009,
p. 25).
The subsequent branding of New Zealand wine as quality
Sauvignon Blanc, and, to a lesser extent, Pinot Noir, sharpens
when examining inter-regional trends. While the number of
grape growers in Gisbourne and Hawkes Bay remained
relatively constant over the decade, in Marlborough, where
76 per cent of vines were Sauvignon Blanc in 2009, the
number of grape growers increased from 254 in 2003 to 568 in
2009. Similarly, in Central Otago, where Pinot Noir comprised
78 per cent of all vines in 2009, grape growers increased from
42 to 77 over the same period (NZW, 2009, pp. 3, 18, 22).
This entry of new capital into highly branded, variety-speciﬁc
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Fig. 1. Trends in global value proposition indices: comparison of Australia
with other New World producers and Old World producers, 2000–2009.
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indicates that new capital saw the value in investing in these
regionally-branded varieties destined for export, particularly
in the second lustrum, where global prices were affected
by what Stuart Smith, Chair of New Zealand Wine, described
as the “combined effects of the 2008 supply shock and the
global ﬁnancial crisis” (Smith, 2011, p. 4). This is reﬂected in
the unit value of wine exports increasing at over 9 per cent
per annum from 2000 to 2009 despite the rapid expansion in
the volume of wine exports in the same period (from
20 million litres to 129 million litres (Anderson and Nelgen,
2011, p. 426).
4.2.6. Other countries
The export value proposition index increased by 14.8 per
cent apiece in USA and South Africa during the decade
(Table 3), slightly higher than the rate in Australia, despite
the industries in both countries having lower rates of increase
in export market penetration. Morrison and Rabellotti (2014)
noted that South Africa was the ﬁrst among the SHNW
industries to adopt a nationwide institutional strategy of
market-oriented R&D similar to that adopted in Australia.
Innovations in technology accompanied by training, social
promotion, the provision of industry information and the
development of key markets (Morrison and Rabellotti, 2014,
p. 14) enabled the industry to achieve moderate increases in
the unit values of its wine exports during the 2000s.
In USA, the investments to improve viticulture and oeno-
logical techniques that began late in the 20th century
(Morrison and Rabellotti, 2014, p. 12) paid dividends in
enabling its wine exporters to improve their export value
proposition in the 2000s. As a comparison, the mean unit price
of US still wine exports in 2000 was only US$2.07 compared
with US$3.17 in Australia; the comparable ﬁgures in 2009
were US$4.37 and US$3.61 (Anderson and Nelgen 2011, p.
108). This movement by the US industry to higher price points
to increase unit values was led by major Californian exporters
such as Robert Mondavi Corporation, E&J Gallo and Beringer
Wine Estates (Silverman et al., 2001).
With the exception of France and Italy, the export value
proposition index was much higher than the export market
penetration index for Old World producers (11.3 per cent mean
for Germany, Portugal and Spain). These advances were
brought about principally by the response by Old World
producers to the challenge from New World producers in
which they emphasised wine quality across distinctive regions,
undertook better promotion, marketing and structural invest-
ments, and adopted a more scientiﬁc approach to growing wine
grapes and winemaking (Morrison and Rabellotti, 2014,
pp. 15–20).4.3. Total wine productivity
The fourth column in Table 3 shows the trends in
productivity in transforming winegrapes into total wine
volume. The aggregate volume frontier shifted downwardsby 1.0 per cent per year (Table 3), partly due to incursions into
the domestic markets of these countries by cheaper exports
from other wine-producing countries (Anderson and Nelgen,
2011).
As might be expected, the productivities are quite tightly
bunched throughout the decade but there is some minor
variation across countries. The largest productivity declines
occurred in Australia and Chile (3.5 per cent and 2.6 per
cent, respectively). This outcome in Australia was partly due to
lower sales into the domestic market but also a lack of water
for grape production arising from drought conditions through-
out much of the second lustrum that resulted in grapes with
relatively low liquid content. In Chile, stagnant supplies to the
domestic market for wine explain the reversal of a slight
productivity increase in wine export market penetration to a
small wine total productivity decline: wine consumption per
head declined slightly over the decade (Anderson and Nelgen,
2011, p. 53).
The most dramatic turnaround between export penetration
and productivity occurred in Argentina where the annual rate
of growth in transforming winegrapes into export volume was
18.4 per cent whereas there was an annual rate of decline in
transforming wine grapes into total wine volume of 1.9 per
cent (Table 3). A major factor at play here, noted above, was
the 3.0 per cent annual decline in wine consumption per head
(Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 51) that interacted with an
inability of ﬁrms supplying the domestic market to compete
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supply to the domestic market. The rate of decline in wine
consumption was much higher than in neighbouring Chile,
which is not surprising given that wine consumption per adult
in Chile was less than one-half the level in Argentina at the
beginning of the decade (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 53).
On the other hand, New Zealand, France and Italy avoided
productivity declines while the declines in Germany and USA
were small. In the case of New Zealand, as we have seen, the
fulﬁlment of the strategy of focusing on quality and branding
in the second lustrum resulted in its export value proposition
increasing during this period, save for a minor correction in
2009 (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 426).
4.4. Total wine value proposition
Fig. 1 shows the trends in indices of total wine value
proposition and the ﬁnal column in Table 3 provides the mean
annual percentage change in these indices.
4.4.1. Sources of change in total wine value proposition
Technical change was the major factor inﬂuencing change in
indices of total wine value proposition with the total wine
value frontier shifting outwards at an annual rate of 5.6 per
cent, slightly lower than the rate of 6.1 per cent for the export
wine value frontier. Given that the volume frontier shifted
downwards by 1.0 per cent per year, the value shift was due to
the various demand and supply effects on wine prices,
particularly improvements in perceived quality.
Mean technical efﬁciency estimates in the total wine value
proposition model changed little over the decade, hovering
around 0.9 and not far from the total revenue frontier (Table 4).
The only country experiencing a signiﬁcant change in techni-
cal efﬁciency was Germany (7.2 per cent per year). As for the
transformation of winegrapes into export value, mean scale
efﬁciency was also high and invariant over the study period
around an average of 0.94 (Table 4), suggesting that scale was
not an important factor inﬂuencing the efﬁciency with which
winegrapes were transformed into wine value. A lack of trend
in the mean scale efﬁciency was mirrored by no signiﬁcant
changes in individual countries. On the other hand, a lack of
trend in mix efﬁciency, with a mean of 0.8 over the study
period (Table 4), hid minor individual country changes.
Increases in mix efﬁciency were recorded in New Zealand
and Argentina driven by their greater specialisation in bottled
still white wine (Sauvignon Blanc) and bottled still red wine
(Malbec), respectively. These gains were offset by a 1.7 per
cent decline in Chile (for reasons outlined above) and a 1.6 per
cent decline in Germany slightly offsetting its substantial
increase in technical efﬁciency score.
4.4.2. Comparative analysis
Chile and Australia began the decade with the highest value
proposition indices, with scores of 1.00 and 0.99, respectively
(Table 2). By the end of the decade, they had forfeited their
position of ascendancy to New Zealand and had almost been
caught by South Africa and USA. This was partly a result ofthe decline in productivity in transforming winegrapes into
wine volume in the former two countries. Another factor
causing slow growth in Chile was stagnant domestic con-
sumption of wine.
All countries except France experienced substantially lower
growth rates in their total wine value propositions than in the
growth rates in their export value propositions (Table 3). New
Zealand and Germany were the only countries to experience
double-digit growth rates in the former index. Stagnant or
declining supply to the domestic market was the major factor
causing this divergence; all countries except New Zealand,
South Africa and USA experienced signiﬁcant declines in
domestic supply and the annual rate of decline in domestic
supply was particularly great in Australia. Exports of Aus-
tralian wine as a share of domestic wine production volume
doubled from one-third in 2000 to two-thirds in 2009 and in
2007 comprised 81 per cent (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p.
425). As mentioned earlier, bulk wines increasingly comprised
a larger proportion of still wine exports. During this time,
Australia's wine self-sufﬁciency (the volume of wine produc-
tion divided by beverage wine consumption expressed as a
percentage) fell on average by just over 2 per cent per year.
Concurrently the domestic market came under siege from
increasing import volumes which were assisted by advanta-
geous currency changes. The imports were predominantly
from New Zealand (Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Noir) in the
super-premium category, but also from France (sparkling
wine) and Italy (commercial-premium wine) (Anderson and
Wittwer, 2013b, p. 140).
Australia achieved a growth rate in its total wine value
proposition similar to the rates attained in most Old World
producers except Germany. Of the ﬁve Old World producers,
Germany was the standout performer being the only country to
experience annual growth in both production and per capita
consumption over the 10-year period. Imported wine volume
as a share of domestic wine consumption remained relatively
steady while average growth rates in total and unit export
values were double those of the import growth rates. Using
Australia as a comparison, imported wine volume as a share of
domestic wine consumption grew by 15 per cent per annum
and average growth rates in total and unit import values far
exceeded their export growth rate counterparts (Anderson and
Nelgen, 2011, pp. 400–426).
New Zealand was at the forefront of the New World
producers. The high rate of growth in total wine values in
New Zealand occurred because export values were supported
by a constant volume supplied to the domestic market.
However, more than just domestic consumption increasing
from 16.68 litres per capita in 2000 to 20.16 in 2009 (as
previously noted) the growth in the volume of wine imports
was negative over the decade, averaging 2.89 per cent and
falling from 42 million litres in 2007 to 32 million litres in
2009 (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 83). By comparison, for
example, in the same period, the volume of wine imported to
Australia accelerated from 44 to 61 million litres, averaging
18.73 per cent for the decade, despite it being negligible in the
ﬁrst lustrum (Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, p. 425).
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ive growth rates in their total value wine propositions of 7.6
per cent and 6.6 per cent per year, respectively. Growth rates
due to price effects were highest in New Zealand and South
Africa and moderate for the other New World producers.
Finally, we expected that ﬁrms within a wine industry
engaged in exporting would be more capable of improving
their total value propositions than the non-exporting ﬁrms (that
is, transforming winegrapes into export value would be higher
than transforming them into total value). The results reported
above provide prima facie support for this proposition, but not
uniformly so across the 11 countries. Differences in export and
total value proposition growth rates were most marked in New
World countries (with the slight exception of New Zealand)
plus Portugal and Spain. This result suggests that the wine
industries in these countries were more successful in creating
value in export markets than in defending value in their
domestic markets from import competition.
5. Review and prospects for the Australian wine industry
5.1. Review
Grant et al. (2015) reported that in the year 2000 the
Australian wine industry had a strong comparative advantage
in wine production and export, had the highest global value
proposition index among the 11 countries under study, and
was on the crest of a wave in international markets in a number
of ways. They noted that the industry's strategy in the previous
two decades had earned it a reputation as a producer of
“technically faultless wine”, but also observed that other
countries were beginning to challenge its pre-eminent position.
The 2000s was a tumultuous decade for the industry, as it
was for all SHNW wine industries, with increased competi-
tiveness in wine price and quality against a backdrop of
growing wine surpluses in the global market. By the end of the
decade, all countries had developed strategies to improve the
export quality of their wines, in order to move to higher price
points, and diversifying their offerings. And all were con-
cerned about the impact of their exchange rates and the adverse
impacts of a wine glut on the proﬁtability of their export
industries.
No country was the scrutiny greater than in Australia. The
central ﬁnding of our discussion is that Australia lost its
competitive edge over many other major wine producers in the
decade under study. In terms of the rate of growth of the export
value proposition index, although the Australian industry
enjoyed an increase of 13.3 per cent per year it was outstripped
by all other New World producers except Chile (with an
average increase of 16.6 per cent for Argentina, New Zealand,
South Africa and USA). Furthermore, two Old World produ-
cers, Germany and Portugal, achieved similar scores to
Australia (14 per cent and 12.7 per cent, respectively) over
the same period. As such, it was not merely a matter of other
New World producers taking over Australia's export markets
(as well as meeting expanding overall demand). The situation
was far more nuanced.Our analysis has suggested that the reasons why this
occurred are complex. Nevertheless, they can be divided into
those internal and external to the Australian economy. First, in
terms of signiﬁcant exogenous events several factors proved
signiﬁcant in the course of the decade. With respect to
Australia's competitors, we have suggested that both Argentina
and New Zealand developed successful national-based market-
ing strategies around speciﬁc varieties, while Chile attempted
to do so throughout the course of the decade. While the points
have been canvassed in the discussion above, the more general
observation is that the political economy of these highly
successful strategies – the relationships among producers,
winemakers and peak representative bodies that assumed at
least some responsibility for the strategic direction for the wine
industry at the national level and directed toward international
markets – was crucial to the success enjoyed.
Second, in terms of internal factors, we have seen that the
Australian industry has been characterised as being trapped in
once-successful but now outmoded routines and practices. Yet
other domestic factors were largely out of the control of the
Australian wine industry. Arguably the most salient of these
was the growth in the value of the Australian dollar, especially
in the second lustrum, which affected the competitiveness of
Australian wines in its export markets. The other side of the
exchange rate impact was also extremely important: plentiful
cheap foreign wines, and now affordable previously expensive
French and German wines, ﬂooded into the domestic market.
Between 2000 and 2009, the total wine import volume
increased from 16 million litres to 61 million litres and wine
import value grew from USD64 million to USD365 million
(Anderson and Nelgen, 2011, pp. 77, 99). Our discussion also
noted that the varying availabilities of water over the decade
affected wine volumes.
Yet other events were equally as important, particularly the
Australian industry's inability to reverse the declining price per
litre of exported wines, reﬂected in the changes in the total
value proposition index, which records Australia scoring an
equal third last (with Italy) among all major producers. Further,
Australian consumers were taking advantage of the high
Australian dollar while the industry neglected to develop a
strategic approach to boost the domestic consumption of
Australian wines. Australian wine producers suffered more
than those in other SHNW countries from the combined impact
of an appreciating real exchange rate and an oversupply of
wine on the domestic and export markets during the 2000s.
5.2. Prospects
In essence, any action taken by or on behalf of the
Australian wine industry at the collective level does not,
strictly speaking, fall under the auspices of public policy.
Both the farming of winegrapes and the manufacturing of wine
take place in a deregulated (as opposed to ideal-type “free
market”) context where government intervention that charac-
terised both industries until the mid-1980s has been thoroughly
eschewed (see, for example, Gow and Grant (2010)). The
strategic positioning of the industry conceived at a national
4China is currently Australia’s third-largest export market by value
(ABARES, 2013).
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Grape and Wine Authority (formerly Wine Australia) as well
as voluntary groups of producers rather than falling under
direct government control. As such, public policy in this arena
is limited in both scope and scale. Further, our discussion
reveals that the reasons for the changing comparative positions
of all major wine-exporting economies are complex; any
search for a “silver bullet” solution is misconceived.
Nevertheless, recent strategic thinking in Australia exem-
pliﬁes the approaches now being adopted in all SHNW
countries. On its website, Wine Australia (2013) summarised
its approach to an export marketing strategy thus:
Wine Australia promotes the quality, diversity and value of
Australian wine through a number of marketing initiatives
in Australia and overseas, to support winemakers' strategies
in key markets. The objective of Wine Australia's marketing
approach is to [r]ecapture the excitement about Australian
wine and evolve our positioning towards a stronger
perception of quality, diversity (style, region, place and
story) and value.
Coelli (2013) tells a similar story, succinctly summing up
the recent experiences of the Australian wine industry evi-
denced by the results reported above: “Our competitors have
caught up.” He argues persuasively that a past strategy of
exports of “high volume wines from large companies” with
“low to medium price points” and “reliable good quality for
the price point” is not the answer for the future and concludes
that future growth will rely on promoting the wine regions of
Australia, promoting more high-quality wines, and selecting
and promoting quality indicators.
How successful SHNW countries are in achieving these
sorts of strategic goals will depend partly on whether global
over-supply is reversed and what the future trends are in real
exchange rates. There is a glimmer of hope. Pomarici (2013)
observed that “The wine market is currently facing something
new: scarcity.” He identiﬁed two main drivers that could
“determine a pressure to reduce supply and, at the same time,
determine deep changes in the geographical distribution and
organisation of the wine industry around the world”: climate
change and a combination of slower production growth and
stronger demand.
Anderson and Wittwer (2013c) gave a glimpse of the mid-
term future for Australian wine, observing that proﬁtability
could return to the industry if certain conditions prevailed.
They examined Australia's wine prospects over the next ﬁve
years, “focusing in particular on the roles not only of further
changes in bilateral exchange rates but also of a return by
consumers to higher-quality wine purchases and of continuing
rapid growth in wine demand in emerging economies, espe-
cially China”. Modelling results showed that the “recent
devaluation of the AUD, if sustained, could beneﬁt Australian
winemakers and hence grape growers by 2018” (Anderson and
Wittwer, 2013c, abstract). They also examined an element of
one of the themes of Pomarici (2013) of demand growth, and
noted “how quickly China could become a major destination
for Australian wine exports”, a market that is also being eyedby other SHNW producers (e.g. Wines of Chile, 2013) and Old
World producers (e.g. Robinson, 2013).45.3. A cautionary note
Results reported in this paper should be treated with caution
in light of the lack of data on inputs other than winegrapes in
wine production and marketing. It would aid policy makers if
the relevant institutions in the major wine-producing countries
could collaborate to develop a dataset that includes all inputs
used in producing and marketing wine, and their costs, which
would enable a proﬁt-based comparison of their performance.
It would also be a useful extension of this study to be able to
assess identiﬁable sections of national industries (for example,
cool-climate wine-producing regions versus warm-climate bulk
wine-producing regions) as they are likely to have experienced
different changes in their competitive position. Finally, it
would be helpful to examine events in viticulture as well as
wine production.
The partial nature of the analyses of export performance
should also be treated with caution. The example of the low
French mix efﬁciency score in the export value model referred
to above demonstrates this point. A naïve response to low mix
efﬁciency score would be to conclude that the mix of French
wine exports was highly inefﬁcient and should be changed to
include more sparkling wine and less bottled and bulk still
wine. This response would ignore (a) the differences in the
costs of other inputs in the production and marketing of
Champagne and other wines, (b) the geographical limits to
expanding the use of winegrapes for Champagne, and (c) the
important domestic market for Champagne (the mix efﬁciency
score in the total wine value model is much higher, at 0.84
compared with 0.49 in the export value model).
Notwithstanding these caveats, the French wine industry
was well aware of the mix inefﬁciency by the mid-2000s and
did very much want to increase Champagne exports in
response to the increased global demand that brought about
the high export prices. Decanter (2007) reported that the
French national appellations body, Institut National de l’Or-
igine et de la Qualité, began to consider adding 40 new
communes to the Champagne region in late 2007. This
expansion was approved in 2008 but its effects on exports
will not be fully felt for several years as new plantings start to
yield. Deluze (2010) reported that new plantings are strictly
controlled but the suppression of planting rights will be lifted
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